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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Law is not static; it changes over time as new facts and new situations 
force the law to adapt.  Twentieth century laws will not be able to account 
for twenty-first century technology.  As time progresses, the law will have to 
evolve in order to deal with previously unanticipated situations driven by 
technological advances. 
In particular, international law will soon be inadequate to cope with new 
issues created by the exploration of outer space.  Difficult problems are 
already cropping up and will only continue to multiply.  New technology and 
the increasing involvement of private actors drive many of the areas where 
current international space law will prove insufficient. 
These problems, which once seemed as far off as the stars, are now 
looming over the horizon.  In October 2012 a private company, SpaceX, 
launched “the first official commercial flight to the International Space 
Station.”1  Since that time, SpaceX has conducted six missions to the 
International Space Station and is in the process of testing a reusable rocket.2  
Another company, Planetary Resources Inc., has millions of dollars in 
backing and plans to mine asteroids for their mineral resources in the near 
future.3  Other companies are focusing on extracting valuable resources from 
the moon.4  It is unclear what economically viable rights on the moon those 
companies will be able to establish.5  Similar questions will arise for 
asteroids: Does anyone own an asteroid?  How did the owner establish 
ownership?  Ventures to mine resources and explore outer space could have 
a tremendous effect on humanity by providing scarce resources and an 
avenue for continued space exploration.6 
Other private businesses are expanding into space as well.  Several 
companies are working on conducting space tourism flights, ferrying 
                                                                                                                   
 1 First Official Commercial Cargo Flight Heading to International Space Station, CNN 
(Oct. 8, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/10/07/us/spacex-launch/index.html?hpt=hp_t1. 
 2 Steve Almasy & Amanda Barnett, SpaceX Launch Successful but Historic Booster 
Rocket Landing Fails Again, CNN (Apr. 14, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/14/us/space 
x-rocket-launch/. 
 3 Jesse Riseborough & Thomas Biesheuvel, Google-Backed Asteroid Mining Venture 
Attracts Billionaires, BUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 7, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/news/20 
12-08-06/google-backed-asteroid-mining-venture-adds-billionaire-investors. 
 4 Adam Mann, Loophole Could Allow Private Land Claims on Other Worlds, WIRED (Apr. 
5, 2012), http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2012/04/moon-mars-property/. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Nancy Atkinson, Schweickart: Private Asteroid Mission Is for the Benefit of Humanity, 
UNIVERSE TODAY (Aug. 10, 2012), http://www.universetoday.com/96727/schweickart-private-
asteroid-mission-is-for-the-benefit-of-humanity/. 
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passengers for a quick jaunt into outer space (and, of course, passengers can 
buy space traveler’s insurance first).7  Even before these flights occur, the 
Earth’s orbit is already littered with space debris that endangers flights, 
satellites, space stations, and people on the ground.8   
These examples and more will demonstrate the likely shortcomings of 
current space law.  Numerous proposals have been suggested to deal with 
each of these issues but will not be enough.  Legal disputes are inevitable no 
matter which specific rules are adopted.  With an increasing number of actors 
moving into outer space, the number of disputes will surely rise.  The 
international community should establish a forum to adjudicate those 
disputes.  Such a court should be unbiased, multilateral, and have the power 
to enforce its decisions. 
This Note will first look at the current governing international space law, 
predominately two treaties: the Outer Space Treaty and the Liability 
Convention.  Next, it will discuss current proposals to fill gaps in that law, 
such as the application of private property rights in outer space.  This Note 
will use those proposals to illustrate the need for a dispute resolution system 
over outer space cases.  Finally, the Note will propose a specific system in 
the form of an international court.  It will suggest goals for this court and 
rules to help the court fulfill those goals. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
Space law includes both international and domestic law covering outer 
space activities.9  Five treaties control international space law: the Outer 
Space Treaty,10 the Rescue Agreement,11 the Liability Convention,12 the 
                                                                                                                   
 7 Zach Everson, 11 Questions about the Future of Space Tourism Answered, CONDÉ NAST 
TRAVELER (Mar. 18, 2015), http://www.cntraveler.com/stories/2015-03-18/11-questions-abou 
t-the-future-of-space-tourism-answered; Kenneth Chang, Booking a Flight to Space, With 
Travel Insurance, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/04/science/sp 
ace/spaceflights-prepare-to-expand-customer-base.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.  To reserve 
your seat on a future flight, see http://staging.virgingalactic.com/booking/. 
 8 Steven A. Mirmina, Reducing the Proliferation of Orbital Debris: Alternatives to a 
Legally Binding Instrument, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 649, 649–52 (2005). 
 9 Space Law: Frequently Asked Questions, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE 
AFFAIRS, http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/FAQ/splawfaq.html#index (last visited Oct. 1, 2012). 
 10 The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410 
[hereinafter Outer Space Treaty]. 
 11 The Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of 
Objects Launched into Outer Space, Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570 [hereinafter Rescue 
Agreement]. 
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Registration Convention,13 and the Moon Agreement.14  This Note will 
primarily focus on the Outer Space Treaty and the Liability Convention.   
The Rescue Agreement aims “to develop and give further concrete 
expression to” the duties outlined in the Outer Space Treaty that direct states 
to give “all possible assistance to astronauts . . . and [to] return objects 
launched into outer space.”15  The Registration Convention mandates that 
launching states register their space objects and that the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations maintain a central registry of all those objects.16    
Finally, the Moon Agreement establishes general principles governing 
activities on the moon.17  The Moon Agreement limits activities on the moon 
to “peaceful purposes,” “carried out for the benefit . . . of all countries.”18  
The Moon Agreement declares that “[t]he moon and its natural resources are 
the common heritage of mankind.”19  Developing nations have argued that 
the common heritage of mankind theory protects their interests in 
international natural resources by providing common ownership.20  Only 
fifteen countries are parties to the Moon Agreement,21 and thus it is not 
binding international law upon most states.22 
A.  The Outer Space Treaty 
The Outer Space Treaty establishes general principles and guidelines for 
activities in space.  It is known as the “ ‘constitution’ of outer space” because 
                                                                                                                   
 12 The Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 
29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389 [hereinafter Liability Convention]. 
 13 The Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Jan. 14, 1975, 28 
U.S.T. 695 [hereinafter Registration Convention]. 
 14 The Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial 
Bodies, Dec. 18, 1979, 1363 U.N.S.T. 3 [hereinafter Moon Agreement]. 
 15 Rescue Agreement, supra note 11, at pmbl. 
 16 Registration Convention, supra note 13, arts. II, III.  
 17 Moon Agreement, supra note 14. 
 18 Id. arts. 3, 4. 
 19 Id. art. 11. 
 20 Milton L. Smith, The Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space, in 
SPACE LAW: VIEWS OF THE FUTURE 45, 51 (Tanja L. Zwaan ed., 1988). 
 21 Status of International Agreements Relating to Activities in Outer Space, UNITED 
NATIONS OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS, http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/SpaceLaw/treaty 
status/index.html (last updated Mar. 8, 2014). 
 22 David Johnson, Limits on The Giant Leap for Mankind: Legal Ambiguities of 
Extraterrestrial Resource Extraction, 26 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1477, 1487 (2011). 
802 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 42:797 
 
of “[i]ts broad and general nature and content.”23  Agreed to in 1967, the 
Outer Space Treaty was forged out of Cold War diplomacy, in a world where 
the United States and Soviet Union simultaneously engaged in an arms race 
and a space race.24  This treaty, like any other, resulted from the state of 
geopolitics and technology of the time—in this case the 1960s. 
The Outer Space Treaty covers a broad range of topics, much of it 
reflecting those Cold War concerns.  It attempts to demilitarize space, 
especially the stationing of weapons of mass destruction in space.25  Along 
the same lines, it espouses the importance of “co-operation and mutual 
assistance” and pushes for consultations and agreements between states as 
the mechanisms for working together in space.26  This multilateral 
cooperation is one of the core goals of the Outer Space Treaty as it was 
intended to prevent competition between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. that could 
have spiraled out of control.27 
The Outer Space Treaty includes restrictions on the use of outer space and 
its resources.  Article I directs that the “exploration and use of outer 
space . . . be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all 
countries . . . and shall be the province of all mankind,” but allows “free 
access to all areas of celestial bodies,” and encourages scientific studies.28  
Article II, known as the non-appropriation clause, states: “Outer space, 
including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national 
appropriation.”29  These provisions may restrict private entities from 
obtaining property rights in outer space. 
State liability is also addressed in the Outer Space Treaty.  First, it deems 
states responsible for their own activities and the activities of their 
nationals.30  The treaty puts the onus on states to approve and regulate 
ventures into outer space.31  Second, the Outer Space Treaty establishes that 
a state responsible for a space object (either by launching it or procuring its 
launch) is liable to another state or a state’s nationals for any damage caused 
                                                                                                                   
 23 Siegfried Wiessner, Human Activities in Outer Space: A Framework for Decision-
Making, in SPACE LAW: VIEWS OF THE FUTURE, supra note 20, at 7, 8.  The Outer Space Treaty 
has also been called the “Magna Carta” of outer space.  See, e.g., Smith, supra note 20, at 46. 
 24 Brian Beck, The Next, Small, Step for Mankind: Fixing the Inadequacies of the 
International Space Law Treaty Regime to Accommodate the Modern Space Flight Industry, 
19 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 12 (2009). 
 25 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 10, art. IV. 
 26 Id. arts. IX–XII. 
 27 See Beck, supra note 24, at 12. 
 28 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 10, art. I. 
 29 Id. art. II. 
 30 Id. art. VI. 
 31 Id. 
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by the space object.32  These rules are further developed in the Liability 
Convention, which in many ways implements these standards. 
1.  On Property Rights 
There is some debate about the impact of the province of mankind and 
non-appropriation clauses on the legality of extracting resources from space.  
The most commonly accepted interpretation of the province of mankind 
clause is that it reaffirms the free access rights established in Article I.33  
Other scholars argue that as long as an activity in space benefits all nations in 
some general sense, even if the benefit is indirect, then the activity is 
permitted under the Outer Space Treaty.34 
There is, however, some tension between the ability to freely “use” outer 
space and the principle of non-appropriation.  Many scholars agree that 
establishing a “keep-out” zone or declaring territorial ownership over a 
portion of outer space or a celestial body would be an appropriation in 
violation of the Outer Space Treaty.35  This is in tension with a “use” of outer 
space that prevents someone else from using the same outer space resource.36  
A possible explanation differentiates between an appropriation as a territorial 
claim to sovereignty and a use that does not impinge on other states’ equal 
usage rights.37   
The Outer Space Treaty’s “province of mankind” language can also be 
distinguished from the common heritage principles of the Moon Agreement, 
which goes even further in protecting the interests of non-spacefaring 
states.38  For example, during the ratification process in the U.S. Senate for 
the Outer Space Treaty, the Committee on Foreign Relations attached an 
understanding that “nothing in Article I, paragraph 1 of the treaty diminishes 
                                                                                                                   
 32 Id. art. VII. 
 33 Johnson, supra note 22, at 1500–01 (suggesting that the province of mankind provision 
affirms an equal right to access, instead of prohibiting certain actions). 
 34 Smith, supra note 20, at 46–47 (noting that satellites provide weather reports, 
telecommunications, and greater knowledge about outer space, benefitting most nations even 
though they do not directly own or benefit from the satellites). 
 35 See, e.g., Beck, supra note 24, at 25–26. 
 36 Wiessner, supra note 23, at 13 (questioning why positioning a satellite in geostationary 
orbit would not amount to an appropriation or why consumption of an asteroid’s minerals 
would be a “use” but not “appropriation”). 
 37 Johnson, supra note 22, at 1501–02. 
 38 Id. 
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or alters the right of the United States to determine how it shares the benefits 
and results of its space activities.”39 
While scholars have erred on the side of allowing greater use of outer 
space resources, the text of the Outer Space Treaty itself is unclear.  Even an 
analysis of the history of the drafting of the Treaty does not clarify the issue, 
most likely because the drafters themselves were divided.40  That ambiguity 
reflects the two goals of the Outer Space Treaty and the inherent tension 
between them: encouraging the dreams of space exploration and guarding 
against the nightmares of a combative space race between states or the 
domination of space by one state. 
2.  What are Celestial Bodies? 
The Outer Space Treaty must also be interpreted in order to determine to 
which entities in space it applies.  The text itself repeatedly indicates when 
the provisions apply to “outer space, including the moon and other celestial 
bodies.”41  A debate has arisen over the meaning of “celestial bodies,” 
though the meaning of outer space (the vacuum) and the moon (the one 
prominent in the night sky) are much more obvious.  There are many objects 
in outer space that could fall under the meaning of “celestial bodies”: 
galaxies, stars, planets, natural satellites (moons), comets, meteors, and 
asteroids.42   
One possible interpretation of the term “celestial bodies” comes from the 
text of the treaty.  The Moon Agreement indicates that it applies to celestial 
bodies except for the earth and that it “does not apply to extraterrestrial 
materials which reach the surface of the earth by natural means.”43  This 
provision implies that all other extraterrestrial materials are “celestial 
bodies.”44   
Another proposed solution is to limit “celestial bodies” to natural objects 
in outer space that cannot be moved by artificial means.45  This would 
                                                                                                                   
 39 Wiessner, supra note 23, at 12 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting S. EXEC. REP., 
NO. 90-8 (1967)).  
 40 Johnson, supra note 22, at 1504–07. 
 41 See generally Outer Space Treaty, supra note 10. 
 42 See generally Ernst Fasan, Asteroids and Other Celestial Bodies – Some Legal 
Differences, 26 J. SPACE L. 33 (1998). 
 43 Moon Agreement, supra note 14, art. 1. 
 44 Fasan, supra note 42, at 35–36. 
 45 Id. at 40 (arguing further that if asteroids fell completely under the space treaties no state 
would have the legal right to destroy an asteroid about to collide with the earth). 
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potentially fulfill the drafters’ aim of dealing with larger space objects.46  
Other scholars reject that distinction, arguing that it will change as 
technology advances and that the movability of an asteroid is immaterial to 
whether its minerals can be commercially extracted and moved elsewhere.47  
These attempts at delineation may continue to be complicated by evolving 
scientific knowledge and technological innovation.  As with many other 
statutes and treaties, some vagueness and the need for interpretation seems 
inevitable. 
B.  The Liability Convention 
1.  The Standard of Liability 
The Liability Convention furthers the rules outlined in the Outer Space 
Treaty for state liability regarding space based activities.  While the Outer 
Space Treaty imposed liability on states, the Liability Convention establishes 
standards for state liability.  Article II of the Convention sets out the basic 
rule: “A launching State shall be absolutely liable to pay compensation for 
damage caused by its space object on the surface of the earth or to aircraft in 
flight.”48  There are two key points to draw from this rule.  First, only states 
are liable, not individual people or corporations.  Second, when the damage 
does not occur in outer space, there is strict liability for the damages. 
Article III deals with damage that occurs in outer space itself and 
establishes a fault based standard: 
In the event of damage being caused elsewhere than on the 
surface of the earth to a space object of one launching State or 
to persons or property on board such a space object by a space 
object of another launching State, the latter shall be liable only 
if the damage is due to its fault or the fault of persons for 
whom it is responsible.49 
                                                                                                                   
 46 Id. 
 47 Leslie I. Tennen, Towards a New Regime for Exploitation of Outer Space Mineral 
Resources, 88 NEB. L. REV. 794, 796 (2010). 
 48 Liability Convention, supra note 12, art. 2 (emphasis added).  A “launching State” is 
defined as “(i) A State which launches or procures the launching of a space object”; or “(ii) A 
State from whose territory or facility a space object is launched.”  Id. art. 1, para. c.  Damage 
includes “loss of life, personal injury, . . . or damage to property.”  Id. art. 1, para. a. 
 49 Id. art. 3. 
806 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 42:797 
 
Thus, as with the rule in Article II, only states have liability, and states are 
responsible for the people it sends into space.  Additionally, the damage must 
be caused by a “space object.”  This seems to leave open the issue of damage 
caused by an individual person.50 
The Liability Convention institutes other important rules in addition to the 
standards for liability.  Many of these rules are similar to American tort law.  
The Liability Convention establishes joint and several liability when 
“launching state” refers to more than one state.51  It also creates a standard 
for contributory negligence to excuse absolute liability, when the claimant 
acts with “gross negligence” or “intent to cause damage.”52  The Convention 
explicitly does not apply to the “nationals of that launching state” or foreign 
nationals involved in the “operation” or “launching” of the space object.53 
2.  Resolution of Disputes 
When damage occurs, the Liability Convention outlines a two-tiered 
process for bringing a claim against another state.  The first path to bringing 
a claim is through “diplomatic channels.”54  The most preferred result under 
the Liability Convention is for states to deal with problems themselves 
through diplomacy.   
The Convention does, however, create a second option, should diplomacy 
fail.  If the states have failed to reach an agreement after one year, the parties 
will set up a Claims Commission once either of the parties requests such a 
commission.55  This second option represents an ad hoc solution that has the 
potential to vary greatly.  The Liability Convention prescribes the basic rules 
for a Claims Commission.  It consists of three members, one appointed by 
each of the two parties and the third agreed upon by both parties.56  The 
Claims Commission will evaluate the merits and decide on an amount of 
compensation if necessary.57 
The Liability Convention, however, limits the power of the Claims 
Commission.  The Commission’s decision is binding if and only if the parties 
have agreed to that power beforehand.  Otherwise, the Commission merely 
                                                                                                                   
 50 For example, the Liability Convention does not appear to cover a tort between two 
people on the same space station.  Id. 
 51 Id. art. 5. 
 52 Id. art. 6. 
 53 Id. art. 7. 
 54 Id. art. 9. 
 55 Id. art. 14. 
 56 Id. art. 15. 
 57 Id. art. 18. 
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delivers a reasoned recommendation.58  The Claims Commission does have 
much greater power over how it reaches a decision.  The Commission 
decides on “its own procedure . . . where it shall sit and all other 
administrative matters.”59 
While the Liability Convention provides this two-avenue approach for 
resolving disputes, it also gives great leeway to states to employ other 
mechanisms.  It leaves open the possibility of bringing suit in the launching 
state: “Nothing in this Convention shall prevent a State, or natural or 
juridical persons it might represent, from pursuing a claim in the courts or 
administrative tribunals or agencies of a launching State.”60  It also allows 
states to enter into their own agreements without interference from the 
Liability Convention.61  Thus, current international law on liability in space 
leaves open the possibility of having numerous different dispute resolution 
avenues. 
3.  Some Open Questions 
The Liability Convention is not comprehensive.  It leaves several areas 
unanswered or incomplete.  One example is that the “Convention does not 
deal meaningfully with problems that may arise when injuries are sustained 
in the environment of space or on a celestial body.”62  Additionally, as 
discussed earlier, there is a fault based standard for damage between space 
objects in outer space, but it does not address other possible situations such 
as torts between individuals. 
Scholars and practitioners also debate about the meaning of “space 
object.”  The Convention itself defines a space object to include “component 
parts of a space object as well as its launch vehicle and parts thereof.”63  One 
author argues that this raises two questions: First, does a launch vehicle also 
have to enter outer space?  Second, if an object is not launched but built in 
space, is it still a space object?64  Another major issue is, quite literally, the 
intersection between space law and air law.  For a craft that travels into outer 
                                                                                                                   
 58 Id. art. 19. 
 59 Id. art. 16. 
 60 Id. art. 11. 
 61 Id. art. 23. 
 62 Herbert Reis, Some Reflection on the Liability Convention, 6 J. SPACE L. 125, 127 (1978) 
(suggesting that another treaty may be necessary once more people are in space).  Herbert 
Reis served as the chief negotiator for the U.S. on the Liability Convention from 1967. 
 63 Liability Convention, supra note 12, art. 1. 
 64 Dan St. John, The Trouble with Westphalia in Space: The State-Centric Liability Regime, 
40 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 686, 696 (2012). 
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space but travels long distances in airspace, which law governs?  Is the 
vehicle a spacecraft or an aircraft?65  This question will be particularly 
relevant for space tourism where the flights only enter outer space for a few 
minutes but fly in airspace for much longer.66  Much like the difficulties with 
classifying the term “celestial bodies,” these questions will need to be 
resolved in some fashion by the international community.  It can be 
expected, however, that even with greater clarification some ambiguity will 
remain, especially as technology advances. 
C.  Domestic and Foreign Law 
1.  Property Rights—United States Case Law 
United States courts have not reviewed many space issues.  It may be too 
early in the commercialization of outer space activities to have too many 
lawsuits develop.  A U.S. District Court in Nevada has heard one case that 
deals with an individual’s claim of private ownership of an asteroid.67  In 
Nemitz v. United States a pro se litigant sought to prove his property rights 
over a specific asteroid upon which NASA had landed a spacecraft.68  The 
district court dismissed for failure to state a legal claim because neither 
NASA provisions promoting the use of space, nor U.S. ratification of the 
Outer Space Treaty created private property rights for Nemitz.69   
While on the surface this case might preclude individual companies from 
establishing property rights in outer space, it can easily be distinguished from 
those hypothetical cases.  Nemitz relied on a registration with the 
Archimedes Institute website and filing a security interest under the Uniform 
Commercial Code with the asteroid as collateral to establish his ownership.70  
Neither of these creates private property rights.71  A company who lands a 
spacecraft on an asteroid may have a better claim under a first in time, first in 
right theory or because the company has actual possession.  Congress has yet 
                                                                                                                   
 65 United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, Compilation of Replies Received from 
Member States to the Questionnaire on Possible Legal Issues with Regard to Aerospace 
Objects, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/635 and Addenda (Jan. 26, 2005), available at http://www.uno 
osa.org/oosa/SpaceLaw/aero/index.html. 
 66 Chang, supra note 7. 
 67 Nemitz v. United States, 2004 WL 3167042, at 1 (D. Nev. 2004), aff’d sub nom. Nemitz 
v. Nat’l Aeronautics and Space Admin., 126 F. App’x 343 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. at 1–2. 
 70 Id. at 1. 
 71 Id.  
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to allocate property rights in asteroids or other celestial bodies.72  It is 
possible, however, that U.S. courts would further the logic of this court that 
the Outer Space Treaty does not allow for private property rights.73     
2.  Liability—Statutory Law 
The Liability Convention only applies to states, leaving to each country 
the authority to make laws governing their nationals’ adventures beyond the 
Earth’s atmosphere.  In the United States Congress has enacted laws 
specifically addressing outer space activities by private entities.  The 
Commercial Space Launch Act regulates and encourages the commercial 
space flight industry.74  It lays out several requirements for a company to 
obtain a license.  The company must be financially responsible, take out 
insurance (usually), and waive claims against the United States for any 
damages it incurs while operating under its license.75  Thus, acting under the 
Liability Convention, the United States attempts to shift some of the 
responsibility to the companies themselves. 
Other countries have their own statutory rules for outer space activities, 
covering a range of space law issues.76  For the most part, however, these 
rules are less thorough than the regulation in the United States.77  Because 
only a limited number of states and corporations have the capability of 
launching objects into space, parties wishing to send an object into space 
often must make transnational business deals.78  This oftentimes creates legal 
uncertainty because of the “potential applicability of different national laws 
and legal regimes, which can conflict.”79  These transnational business 
                                                                                                                   
 72 See, e.g., id. (holding that a private individual had no cognizable property rights in an 
asteroid). 
 73 See Robert Kelly, Nemitz v. United States, A Case of First Impression: Appropriation, 
Private Property Rights and Space Law before the Federal Courts of the United States, 30 J. 
SPACE L. 297, 307 (2004) (arguing that control over asteroids by private persons or businesses 
would constitute “national appropriation ‘by any other means,’ ” in violation of the Outer 
Space Treaty). 
 74 51 U.S.C. §§ 50901–50923 (2012).  The Commercial Space Launch Act was previously 
Title 49, Section 70101, et seq. 
 75 Tennen, supra note 47, at 820. 
 76 For a collection of national space laws, see National Space Law Database, UNITED 
NATIONS OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS, http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/oosa/en/Space 
Law/national/state-index.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2014). 
 77 VALÉRIE KAYSER, LAUNCHING SPACE OBJECTS: ISSUES OF LIABILITY AND FUTURE 
PROSPECTS 12 (2001). 
 78 Id. at 14. 
 79 Id. at 12. 
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interactions will only occur with increasing frequency because of the 
privatization of space exploration.  Even with a handful of treaties in place, 
the national law that exists is more detailed and more directly applicable to 
businesses. 
III.  CURRENT PROPOSALS 
Space law is a relatively new area of law.  International space law is 
limited to five short treaties;80 only one of which has very broad language.  
The others have limited scope, dealing with early space law problems such as 
the safe return of astronauts and tracking objects sent into space.  Numerous 
proposals have been made to improve space law.  Most of the academic 
proposals involve suggestions for new substantive rules and will be 
discussed below.  Few address how to administer these new rules or how to 
resolve disputes arising under the proposed international legal frameworks.  
This section will provide a brief overview of some of these substantive 
proposals for property rights and liability in outer space. 
A.  Property Rights 
The Outer Space Treaty leaves the availability of private property rights 
in outer space unclear.  Commentators worry that this uncertainty will 
discourage commercial ventures beyond the earth’s atmosphere.81  To 
address this concern, these commentators have proposed a variety of private 
property schemes for outer space resources such as asteroids. 
There are several key distinctions between these proposals.  One is 
whether or not to treat asteroids as real property or personal property.  The 
other is whether to use free market principles or the non-appropriation 
principles of the Outer Space Treaty. 
1.  First Possession 
Perhaps the most extreme proposal is to open up outer space following 
first possession rules.82  This proposal treats celestial bodies as real property 
and allocates property rights along a “first in time, first in right” rule similar 
                                                                                                                   
 80 UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS, supra note 9. 
 81 See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 22, at 1480. 
 82 See, e.g., Brandon C. Gruner, A New Hope for International Space Law: Incorporating 
Nineteenth Century First Possession Principles into The 1967 Space Treaty for The 
Colonization of Outer Space in the Twenty-First Century, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 299 (2004). 
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to homesteading in the nineteenth century United States, where settlers 
rushed to claim unsettled land before others got there.83  Under this system a 
“discovering nation” would be able to claim territory in outer space and 
choose whether to open up settlement in its new territory to its own citizens 
or to the international community as a whole.84  The sovereignty of the 
“discovering nation” would extend to its outer space territory, where it could 
govern as it pleased.85 
A first possession scheme has several difficulties, even though it achieves 
its chief goal of encouraging economic development.  First, without a 
centralized mechanism for demarcating the property, disputes are inevitable, 
as was the case with homesteading in the West.86  Second, how will states or 
settlers resolve these disputes?  Territorial disputes do not often end well.87  
If the international community, or members of the community, adopted a 
“first in time, first in right,” system for divvying up property rights, states 
may better avoid conflict by establishing clear expectations ahead of time, 
particularly by agreeing on a framework for resolving disputes. 
2.  U.S. Common Law—The Estates 
Other commentators propose a closer balance between encouraging 
commercial exploration of space and maintaining the “province of mankind” 
language of the Outer Space Treaty.88  One such proposal advocates having 
an intergovernmental organization (IGO) such as the United Nations use 
U.S. common law property rights to distribute property to private persons or 
corporations.89  The twist is that the IGO would not transfer fee simple 
absolute but less complete property rights such as a defeasible estate, 
                                                                                                                   
 83 Id. at 344–47. 
 84 Id. at 347–48. 
 85 Id. at 350–51.  Although Gruner does suggest some role for the Outer Space Treaty and 
international law, it appears to be a secondary concern and subject to the whims of each 
individual state as it colonizes space. 
 86 Teaching with Documents: The Homestead Act of 1862, NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://www. 
archives.gov/education/lessons/homestead-act/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2012). 
 87 See, e.g., John Vazquez & Marie T. Henehan, Territorial Disputes and the Probability of 
War, 1816–1992, 38 J. PEACE RES. 123 (2001) (supporting generally “the territorial 
explanation of war” and stating that territorial disputes “account for the majority of wars”). 
 88 Davin Widgerow, Boldly Going Where No Realtor Has Gone Before: The Law of Outer 
Space and a Proposal for a New Interplanetary Property Law System, 28 WIS. INT’L L.J. 490, 
513 (2010). 
 89 Id. 
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leasehold, or license, allowing the IGO to limit use of the property, 
protecting the interests of all mankind.90 
The author of this proposal, Davin Widgerow, admits the need for 
adjudication of disputes arising under this system.91  The proposal suggests 
three possible examples on which to base such a system of adjudication: the 
Claims Commission from the Liability Convention, international arbitration, 
and the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal.92  There 
seems to be an inherent tension, however, between the common law 
approach suggested earlier and these adjudication models, especially the 
Claims Commission and arbitration.  Because states create a Claims 
Commission on an ad hoc basis and appoint arbitrators, these bodies would 
likely lack the institutional memory and continuity that a court needs to 
develop common law.   
A standing body like the Seabed Disputes Chamber may have a better 
chance but would need to be able to hear cases between two private entities, 
not just between the IGO and its grantees.93  Basic property law suggests this 
is insufficient.  Property law cases are not always between the original 
grantor and grantee.  Additionally, the alienability of land contributes greatly 
to its value.  Granting inalienable territory would likely decrease the 
incentive of private entities to purchase it from an IGO.  The more sticks in 
the bundle of property rights one receives, the more likely one is to buy. 
3.  Asteroids as Personal Property 
Treating all celestial bodies as equivalent to land territory on the earth 
may not reflect the nature of those celestial bodies.  Some have argued that 
international law must distinguish between asteroids and other celestial 
bodies such as planets.94  Legally, asteroids could be treated as personal 
                                                                                                                   
 90 Id. at 514–15.  Note that this article assumes “province of mankind” means ownership of 
mankind.  Thus the UN or other IGO acts as the owner of outer space on behalf of all 
mankind. 
 91 Id. at 515. 
 92 Id. at 515–16. 
 93 Widgerow’s article suggests that an adjudicatory body modeled off of the Seabed 
Disputes Chamber would only “adjudicate disputes between the international community and 
private . . . companies.”  Id. at 516. 
 94 Andrew Tingkang, These Aren’t the Asteroids You Are Looking For: Classifying 
Asteroids in Space as Chattels, Not Land, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 559, 561 (2012); see also 
Fasan, supra note 42 (arguing that the difference between asteroids and other celestial bodies 
requires each to have a separate definition under international law). 
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rather than real property.95  One key characteristic of asteroids is that they are 
more difficult to track than planets or real estate on earth.96  This makes an 
asteroid seem more like a chattel, which may be lost. 
This problem with tracking seems to make asteroids uniquely vulnerable 
to disputes over ownership, particularly before a physical presence has been 
established on the asteroid.  Often, tracking fails and one asteroid is 
identified as a different asteroid multiple times.97  This proposal does not 
outline how these personal property rights are acquired. 
What would happen if two private actors have claims to the same 
asteroid?  Even if asteroids are properly identified, disputes may still arise, as 
they do on earth, over trespass to chattels, the sale of goods, and other issues.  
The difference between asteroids and other chattels, however, is that the 
property rights are based on international law, and the asteroids will likely be 
owned only by corporations doing transnational business.  People operating 
in space will need a way to resolve disagreements whether asteroids are 
treated as real property or personal property. 
B.  Liability 
The Liability Convention and national legislation, such as the 
Commercial Space Launch Act in the United States, govern the issue of 
liability under space law.  The body of law on liability, however, is often 
incomplete.  Drafted at a time when a small number of states were the only 
actors venturing into outer space, the Liability Convention covers only a 
limited set of possible facts.98  Many states do not even have domestic space 
laws, and those that do typically lack the thoroughness of American law.99  
People analyzing the Liability Convention widely agree that the law must 
move away from its focus on states.100  Unlike property law concerns, many 
                                                                                                                   
 95 Tingkang, supra note 94, at 579–86 (outlining differences between asteroids and planets 
including their size, shapes, and the ability to move and split asteroids). 
 96 Id. at 581–82. 
 97 Id. 
 98 See, e.g., Reis, supra note 62. 
 99 KAYSER, supra note 77.  The use of domestic law may further be limited because space 
travel occurs outside a country’s territory in the sovereign-less expanses of space.  See Beck, 
supra note 24, at 22. 
 100 See, e.g., Beck, supra note 24, at 37 (“The Liability Convention’s complete failure to 
hold private entities accountable poses problems for all commercial space developments.”); 
see also St. John, supra note 64, at 711–13 (outlining problems with a “state-centric regime” 
but concluding that the requirements of liability insurance and cross-waivers of liability will 
have to do for now). 
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proposals for changing space liability law address adjudicating these 
transnational disputes as well as establishing substantive rules. 
1.  Market Share Liability 
Some commentators argue in favor of changing the standard of liability.  
The standard under the Liability Convention is typically strict liability.101  
One proposal calls for the use of market-share liability to apportion 
damages.102  The suggested scheme would attribute the market share of 
unidentified space debris amongst states according to the percentage of space 
debris identified as belonging to that state.103  This idea has become 
increasingly popular with academics to solve the issue of liability for damage 
from space debris.104  Like the pharmaceuticals to which market-share 
liability was first applied, it can often be very difficult, if not impossible, to 
determine the origin of space debris that may cause great damage to a space 
object.105   
This particular proposal attempts to work within the Liability Convention 
by amending it to use market-share liability for damage caused by space 
debris.106  Market-share liability may well be a successful solution for 
dealing with the problem of space debris.  Working within the framework of 
the Claims Commission, however, does not add value to this substantive law.  
In fact, in the United States, market-share liability was developed by courts, 
not arbitration committees.  The arguments made in this Note demonstrate 
the need for a permanent court over an ad hoc commission, and they apply 
with equal force whether the substantive rules call for strict liability, market-
share liability, or some other standard. 
2.  Alternative Dispute Resolution 
The Claims Commission framework created in the Liability Convention 
resembles arbitration more than a court.  Some have argued that alternative 
dispute resolution represents the best way to settle disagreements arising 
                                                                                                                   
 101 Liability Convention, supra note 12, art. 2. 
 102 Mark J. Sundahl, Unidentified Orbital Debris: The Case for a Market-Share Liability 
Regime, 24 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 125, 141 (2000). 
 103 Id. at 144–45.  This method would, at present, assign the United States a 52.9% market 
share and Russia a 40.8% market share.  Id. at 146. 
 104 Id. at 138–39. 
 105 Id. at 143. 
 106 Id. at 152–53. 
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under international space law.107  Alternative dispute resolution has many 
benefits and overcomes several shortcomings of international space law.  The 
difficulty, however, is that the usual problems associated with alternative 
dispute resolution are greatly exaggerated in the space law context. 
As discussed above, the Liability Convention and domestic law leave 
several gaps in the legal framework, which private parties may be able to 
overcome by using alternative dispute resolution.  First, because parties to 
arbitration agree to the governing law beforehand, there will not be the same 
choice of law problems.108  Second, because parties can choose the 
substantive and procedural law, these arbitrations would not have to follow 
the strict liability standard articulated in the Liability Convention.109  
Alternative dispute resolution may facilitate a fairer or more efficient 
standard, whether it be fault based or market-share based.110 
Several other potential benefits of alternative dispute resolution have been 
articulated.  First, it may be more cooperative rather than adversarial.111  
Second, allowing private businesses to decide on the applicable substantive 
and procedural law could lead to better outcomes.112  Finally, alternative 
dispute resolution may be faster than recourse in the courts.113 
While this system may benefit private businesses, it does not further the 
other goals of international space law as outlined in the Outer Space Treaty, 
nor does it address other gaps in the law involving individuals or states.  The 
Outer Space Treaty—the constitution of space law—makes it clear that the 
law has dual objectives: encouraging space exploration and establishing that 
all of mankind has an interest in outer space.114  Private businesses could use 
alternative dispute resolution to duck the implications of public policy by 
choosing other substantive and procedural rules.  They can cherry pick the 
law most favorable to business and least supportive of the province of 
mankind principle. 
Second, alternative dispute resolution does not further the goal of 
cooperation in outer space.  Any cooperation that occurs is only between the 
                                                                                                                   
 107 Ka Fei Wong, Collaboration in the Exploration of Outer Space: Using ADR to Resolve 
Conflicts in Space, 7 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 445 (2006). 
 108 Id. at 466.  Choice of law problems may arise particularly frequently in unanticipated 
factual situations, such as if there was no “launching state” under international law because 
the space object was built in outer space.  Id. at 456. 
 109 Id. at 466. 
 110 Id. at 471. 
 111 Id. at 465. 
 112 Id. at 466. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 10, art. 1. 
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two private companies.115  This argument confuses the desire for interstate 
cooperation with a desire for corporate cooperation.  Instead, most people 
want to foster competition between private businesses in order to incentivize 
innovation and exploration of outer space.116  States are different animals 
because interstate competition can lead to military conflict instead of better 
business practices.  The history of the space law treaties indicates the 
overriding goal was to avoid conflict between the United States and the 
Soviet Union and the militarization of space.117  Furthermore, extensive use 
of alternative dispute resolution may limit the possibilities for fostering 
interstate cooperation by taking states almost entirely out of the process of 
resolving disputes. 
Another drawback of alternative dispute resolution is that it generally 
applies only in limited circumstances: disputes between private businesses.118  
Generally, agreements to arbitrate disputes only occur between parties in 
privity with one another.  How would this mechanism address a 
disagreement over competing ownership claims over an asteroid?  Such a 
dispute does not necessarily arise out of a contract or any prior relationship 
between the parties.  The arbitrator or mediator would then have the power to 
decide property rights between two parties when a third party may also have 
a claim.119   
Alternative dispute resolution would likely not provide a forum for 
individuals with a claim against a corporation, unless the parties had a 
contract.  Furthermore, all of the usual complaints about alternative dispute 
resolution, especially mandatory arbitration for consumers,120 also apply 
when disagreements arise under space law.  Thus, alternative dispute 
                                                                                                                   
 115 See Wong, supra note 107, at 465. 
 116 See, e.g., Gruner, supra note 82 (advocating a competitive first in time, first in right 
system for allocating property rights in outer space). 
 117 Beck, supra note 24, at 36 (“The international space treaty regime served its original 
purpose well.  The United States and the Soviet Union never undertook any significant 
militarization of space.”). 
 118 Wong, supra note 107, at 466.  Consider, however, the claim that “ADR could and 
should be used to resolve most legal conflicts in space law.”  Id. at 465. 
 119 United States federal courts, in contrast, would allow that third party to intervene.  See 
generally  FED. R. CIV. P. 24. 
 120 Josha T. Mandelbaum, Stuck in a Bind: Can the Arbitration Fairness Act Solve the 
Problems of Mandatory Binding Arbitration in the Consumer Context?, 94 IOWA L. REV. 
1075, 1077 (2009) (“These problems include high fees, a lack of due-process safeguards, 
unequal bargaining power, arbitrator bias toward the business, the bar of class-action suits, 
potential private usurpation of the roles of the judicial and legislative branches, and society’s 
inability to make good policy decisions going forward because of a lack of information.”). 
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resolution should not be encouraged, and the international community should 
think carefully about closely monitoring its voluntary use by private entities. 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Barriers to Bringing Suit 
Current international and domestic law provides limited avenues for 
obtaining judicial relief with respect to complaints arising from events in 
outer space.  A number of barriers make it especially difficult for non-state 
actors to pursue these types of claims. 
1.  Against a Foreign Defendant 
A private plaintiff will have particular problems suing a foreign 
defendant.  Take, for example, an American space tourist who suffers harm 
during a flight run by a Russian company departing from Russia.121  
Depending on the specific facts, she will likely have problems suing in an 
American court because of a lack of personal jurisdiction.  A Russian 
company, operating in Russia, likely does not have continuous and 
systematic contacts with the United States sufficient to justify general 
jurisdiction.122  The Russian company might not have purposeful contacts 
with the United States sufficient to permit specific jurisdiction either, if the 
company’s only contact with the forum state was the sale of a ticket to the 
space tourist.123  Without jurisdiction in American courts, the tourist must 
look elsewhere. 
The alternative legal avenues are international and foreign law.  The 
Liability Convention would not provide an avenue for recourse if the 
American government does not act.124  To sue in Russian courts, the space 
                                                                                                                   
 121 Example adapted from Beck, supra note 24, at 22 (providing the hypothetical of an 
American businessman on a space flight operated by Russia).  Beck’s actual hypothetical is 
discussed next. 
 122 See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011) (holding that 
the sale of tires by a Goodyear subsidiary in North Carolina was insufficient to establish 
general jurisdiction such that North Carolina courts could hear claims unrelated to Goodyear’s 
contacts with the state).  
 123 J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011) (holding that New Jersey 
could not exercise jurisdiction over a foreign company whose only contact with New Jersey 
was the presence of four machines that ended up in New Jersey). 
 124 Liability Convention, supra note 12, art. 7 (stating that claims are brought by one state 
against another). 
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tourist must rely on Russia’s domestic law.125  The high costs of travel and 
litigating in a foreign court may prevent this suit from ever being filed in a 
Russian court.126 
The American tourist will have even greater difficulties if the Russian 
government sold the space tourism flight instead of a private business.  Even 
if the tourist can obtain personal jurisdiction over the Russian government in 
the United States, the suit may be barred by sovereign immunity.127  To 
determine whether sovereign immunity applies, a court would first look at 
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, which grants immunity in American 
courts to foreign states.128  There are several exceptions allowing a plaintiff 
to bring suit, but it will be an uphill battle.  The main exception applies when 
the foreign state is engaged in a commercial activity.129  Whether the outer 
space activity is a commercial activity will depend on the nature of the 
conduct130 and the connection between the conduct and the United States.131 
Extraterritoriality also presents a potential burden to suing in American 
courts.  Because the plaintiff’s claim is based on conduct in outer space, 
outside of the sovereign territory of the United States, a court may decide not 
to hear the claim.  Whether or not the extraterritorial nature of the claim bars 
the suit depends on the cause of action.  If the plaintiff brings a statutory 
based claim, then the court will decide whether the legislature intended the 
statute to apply extraterritorially, but the courts presume statutes do not apply 
extraterritorially.132  It is unlikely that causes of action that apply 
                                                                                                                   
 125 See Beck, supra note 24, at 22. 
 126 See Van C. Ernest, Note, Third Party Liability of the Private Space Industry: To Pay 
What No One Has Paid Before, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 503, 540 (1991) (discussing the 
impediment that travel costs and legal complexity would pose for parties utilizing a foreign 
tribunal). 
 127 Beck, supra note 24, at 22. 
 128 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2006) (“[A] foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the 
courts of the United States and of the States except as provided in sections 1605–1607 of this 
chapter.”). 
 129 Id. § 1605. 
 130 See, e.g., Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607 (1992) (finding that the sale of 
bonds by the Argentinian government constituted a commercial activity). 
 131 Marla Stayduhar, Flying the Friendly Skies May Not Be So Friendly in Outer Space: 
International and Domestic Law Leaves United States’ Citizen Space Tourists Without a 
Remedy for Injury Caused by Government Space Debris, 7 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1, 
¶¶ 27–28 (2006) (arguing that the commercial activity exception would be useful for a case 
based on commercial space debris but not for a space tourist). 
 132 See, e.g., Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 390–91 (2005) (holding that the term 
“convicted in any court” in a federal gun possession statute only applied to domestic 
convictions because of a presumption that Congress intends statutes to have only domestic and 
not extraterritorial effect, unless there is evidence to the contrary in the text, purpose, or 
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extraterritorially would also apply to outer space because it is unlikely that 
Congress intended to extend the reach of causes of actions that far. 
Problems with jurisdiction, sovereignty, and extraterritoriality, combined 
with the complications of filing suit in a foreign country, make it very 
difficult for individual citizens to pursue claims arising out of conduct in 
outer space. 
2.  Against the United States 
It is unlikely that someone could successfully bring a tort claim against 
the United States federal government for its actions in outer space.  The 
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) governs the government’s waiver of its 
sovereign immunity to tort claims.133  The FTCA states “[t]he United States 
shall be liable . . . to the same extent as a private individual under like 
circumstances.”134  The FTCA provides for exceptions to this waiver to 
sovereign immunity, including for “[a]ny claim arising in a foreign 
country.”135  Does that include claims arising in outer space? 
Outer space is not a foreign country but the exception may still apply.  
The Supreme Court has held that the foreign country exception in the FTCA 
barred a wrongful death suit based on acts occurring in Antarctica because 
Antarctica, even without a government, fit within the ordinary meaning of 
“foreign country” and because such a reading prevented absurd results in the 
rest of the statute.136  Because of the Court’s reasoning in that case, the Court 
would very likely decide that outer space also constitutes a “foreign 
country.”137  Congress could always amend the statute in the future, but for 
now, individual plaintiffs likely cannot successfully bring outer space-based 
claims against the United States. 
                                                                                                                   
legislative history of the statute); Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 561 U.S. 247 (2010) 
(reaffirming the presumption against extraterritoriality). 
 133 Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671–2680 (2006). 
 134 Id. § 2674. 
 135 Id. § 2680(k). 
 136 Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197 (1993) (holding that Antarctica is a foreign country 
for purposes of the FTCA). 
 137 Lauren S.-B. Bornemann, This is Ground Control to Major Tom . . . Your Wife Would 
Like to Sue but There’s Nothing We Can Do . . . The Unlikelihood That the FTCA Waives 
Sovereign Immunity for Torts Committed by United States Employees in Outer Space: A Call 
for Preemptive Legislation, 63 J. AIR L. & COM. 517, 532–36 (1998). 
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B.  Towards a Solution 
The shortcomings of the international law governing outer space are 
clear.  It was designed for a bygone era of state exploration of outer space 
driven by the bipolar competition of the Cold War.138  It is conceivable that 
in the future human behavior beyond Earth’s boundaries will more closely 
resemble the extent and nature of human activity on Earth.  Increased activity 
in heretofore sovereignless space requires a new legal regime. 
This new legal system must account for the interests of private 
individuals and businesses in outer space.  Under the Outer Space Treaty 
each state “shall retain jurisdiction and control over” any object and 
personnel it launches into outer space.139  This legal regime does not reflect 
the reality that private businesses are taking the lead in industries like space 
tourism.140 
When disputes arise in outer space, they will need to be settled in 
accordance with the governing substantive law.  Currently, that law has two 
main objectives: protecting the province of mankind and fostering economic 
development of outer space resources.  A successful legal regime will help 
fulfill both of these goals and provide legal recourse to non-state actors.  
A court with jurisdiction over outer space controversies will allow for 
commerce to expand beyond the earth’s atmosphere.  A system that can 
provide legal security will provide greater incentives for investment.141  
Current law creates great legal risk for investors because of the uncertainty 
involved in interactions and potential conflicts of international and foreign 
law.142 
                                                                                                                   
 138 See Beck, supra note 24. 
 139 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 10, art. 8. 
 140 Steven Freeland, Fly Me to the Moon: How Will International Law Cope with 
Commercial Space Tourism?, 11 MELB. J. INT’L L. 90, 108–09 (2010) (arguing that a new 
multilateral treaty should attach liability to the private conductors of space tourism flights 
because it better addresses passenger and third party liability). 
 141 Michael Wollersheim, Considerations Towards the Legal Framework of Space Tourism, 
SPACE FUTURE (Apr. 21, 1999), http://www.spacefuture.com/archive/considerations_towards 
_the_legal_framework_of_space_tourism.shtml (“Especially for private enterprises that 
perform commercial space activities such as space tourism, legal security—on a level of 
private and public international law—is a mandatory requirement.”). 
 142 KAYSER, supra note 77, at 12, 14 (giving the example of satellite owners who have to 
buy launching services from foreign countries and the further complications when some 
businesses are state-owned and others are privately operated). 
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Having a centralized court to adjudicate suits could create greater 
predictability and legal certainty.143  First, businesses will know that they 
will only be sued in one court.  This allows the business to plan ahead to 
reduce costs and risks.144  Second, the court will develop precedents that can 
help inform decision makers who can then rely on consistent results. 
A centralized court could also protect the interests of all mankind in outer 
space.  Judges would be picked by states instead of the litigants and would be 
tasked with enforcing international law.  Currently, that law protects the 
interests of all of mankind.145  In contrast, other systems relying on national 
laws will allow corporations to cherry-pick the national law that is most 
favorable to them.146  If states maintain jurisdiction, then businesses will fly 
under the flag of the state with the most business friendly laws.  If 
international arbitration is used, then businesses can select which nation’s 
laws govern the dispute.147  These systems might allow outer space 
businesses to avoid environmental or safety laws that increase costs but 
benefit others. 
For these reasons, a central court could serve a significant role in 
protecting the international community’s twin goals for outer space: 
promoting economic development and preventing unilateral exploitation at 
the expense of others. 
C.  Jurisdiction—A Requirement for Success 
An international outer space court will need several characteristics in 
order to achieve success.  In addition to the support of the international 
community and legitimacy, it will need jurisdiction. 
1.  Sufficient Jurisdiction 
An international outer space court may benefit from the jurisdiction 
lessons of American courts.  In particular, the idea of diversity jurisdiction 
may be beneficial for an outer space court.  Plaintiffs can bring suit in United 
                                                                                                                   
 143 Note that these arguments have even greater weight if the international community also 
agrees upon substantive law to govern outer space as well as the need for a court. 
 144 See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 110 (1987) (“When a 
corporation purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum 
State, it has clear notice that it is subject to suit there, and can act to alleviate the risk of 
burdensome litigation . . . .” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 145 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 10, art. 1. 
 146 Wollersheim, supra note 141. 
 147 Wong, supra note 107, at 466. 
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States federal court when suing a defendant from another state for an amount 
of money greater than the statutorily defined amount in controversy.148  The 
purpose of diversity jurisdiction “is to provide a federal forum for important 
disputes where state courts might favor, or be perceived as favoring, home-
state litigants.”149 
Just as federal courts are used to prevent problems arising from bias, an 
international court could serve as a neutral forum for controversies between 
parties of different countries.  Bringing suit in the defendant’s country could 
just as easily, if not more easily, allow for potential bias as bringing suit in a 
different American state.  Requiring diversity for the outer space court to 
have jurisdiction could also limit its reach and possible encroachment on 
countries’ sovereignty.  The courts of each country could still hear suits 
between or against its nationals. 
2.  Jurisdictional Problems 
Even with jurisdiction, two problems may arise.  First, with regards to the 
issue of sovereign immunity, states would need to waive their immunity, 
presumably through a multilateral treaty, in order for an international tribunal 
to hear complaints against these sovereign governments.  States could choose 
to waive immunity entirely or, alternatively, to waive immunity only in their 
own courts or to not waive immunity at all.  No matter what the outcome is, 
the existence of an outer space court will not make the problem arising out of 
sovereign immunity any worse than it already is because states currently 
control this decision.  It may, however, encourage states to waive sovereign 
immunity out of comity with other states. 
The second problem related to jurisdiction is that potential litigants may 
not have access to the court.  One argument against an international court is 
that it may be too costly to bring suit at all, especially for individuals, 
because of travel expenses and other costs resulting from the complexities of 
unique procedures in the court.150  Certainly, at some point, a plaintiff will be 
unable to pursue a valid claim because she is unable to travel to the seat of 
the relevant court. 
This argument against an international court could also be made against 
the status quo.  The unfortunate aspects of the present situation could only be 
improved, not worsened, by an international court.  Under current law the 
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 150 Ernest, supra note 126, at 540 (concluding that “[t]herefore, it may be best to proceed 
without the creation of the international tribunal”). 
2014] FIRST CONTACT  823 
 
indigent victim will often be unable to bring suit in her local courts.151  
Indeed, in the United States, the Supreme Court has worried more about the 
burden on foreign defendants being dragged into U.S. courts.152  Having one 
court for outer space funnels disputes into one predictable location.  
Furthermore, a potential plaintiff can always sue in the home courts of a 
foreign defendant even though that may be costly and inconvenient. 
D.  International Implications 
The idea of an international outer space court represents a significant 
change to the international legal regime.  It has the potential to greatly affect 
international relations.  In order to be beneficial, the court must obtain 
legitimacy.  There are two basic threshold issues necessary to achieve 
international legitimacy.  First, the court cannot be an ad hoc tribunal or it 
will not send a clear, consistent signal to the international community that 
justice will be served, hampering its legitimacy.153  Instead, this should be a 
permanent, standing court.154  Second, the court must have American 
support.155  Without those two elements, the court will likely fail to have a 
lasting impact. 
If the court can achieve that basic level of success, it has the potential to 
improve international relations concerning outer space.  A multilateral 
approach to outer space exploration could foster cooperation, preventing 
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competition and the militarization of space.156  An international court could 
be the basis of that approach going forward.  A court-based system created 
out of a multilateral treaty encourages states and their nationals to resolve 
their disagreements peaceably.  If disagreements can be resolved in court and 
enforced on Earth, then states will not have a strong incentive to use force to 
protect their interests beyond Earth’s atmosphere.  A cooperative framework 
also has the potential to resolve disputes between developed and developing 
states over the use of natural resources found in outer space.157  Crafting a 
compromise for the substantive law will also play a major role in smoothing 
over those differences, but a standing court at least provides a forum for 
resolution of new quarrels among these repeat players. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The law governing outer space remains incomplete and unprepared to 
deal with the changing nature of human activity beyond Earth’s atmosphere.  
This represents an opportunity for the international community to fashion a 
new legal regime for this ungoverned expanse.  States must adopt new 
substantive rules governing issues such as property rights and liability.   Just 
like with domestic laws, outer space law will require a means to settle 
disagreements and unsettled areas of law.  An international court whose 
jurisdiction covers outer space represents an ambitious but optimal choice.  
Done properly, it can ensure fairness, spur business, protect the interests of 
all mankind, and encourage cooperation.  The international community has a 
blank slate on which to write, a chance to craft the best possible legal regime, 
and it should not pass on that opportunity.  Instead, it should chart an 
ambitious path into outer space with the formation of a court for outer space. 
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